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Abstract
I consider a moral hazard problem with risk neutral parties, limited liability, and an
informed principal. The contractible outcome is correlated to both the principal’s private
information and the agent’s hidden action. In contrast to a model without a privately
informed principal or without limited liability, I show that the first-best payoff cannot be
implemented by any equilibrium mechanism. Furthermore, limited liability precludes the
existence of equilibrium refinements such as (Strongly) Neologism proofness.
1 Introduction
In the standard model of moral hazard, informational asymmetries arise because the principal
is unable to monitor the agent’s effort choice. Yet, under risk neutrality and unlimited liability,
these informational asymmetries do not lead to any distortions; the principal can extract the
full surplus by “selling the firm” to the agent.
However, the principal may also have private information on how the agent’s effort choices
affect the distribution of observable outcomes, i.e., the production technology. For example,
an employer/principal likely has private information about the difficulty of a task an em-
ployee/agent is hired to accomplish. An employer who knows the task is easy may wish to
reveal that information to encourage the agent to work, whereas an employer who knows the
task is difficult may prefer not to disclose that information. Such opposing signaling incentives
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could lead to distortions. Nonetheless, Wagner, Mylovanov, and Tro¨ger (2015) show that when
the production technology satisfies a full rank condition, there is an equilibrium in which the
principal extracts the full surplus.
In this paper, I consider a principal-agent model with risk neutral parties and limited
liability. The principal is privately informed about the production technology which satisfies
the full rank condition. I show that there exists no equilibrium in which the principal can
extract the full surplus and earn her first-best payoff. In contrast, if the principal had no
private information or the agent had unlimited liability, there is an equilibrium in which the
principal extracts the full surplus.
Since informed principal problems often suffer from equilibrium multiplicity, I also consider
the implications of limited liability on two commonly used equilibrium refinements in the in-
formed principal literature: Strongly Neologism proofness (Mylovanov and Tro¨ger, 2012), and
Neologism proofness (Farrell, 1993; Grossman and Perry, 1986). I show that a Strongly Neol-
ogism proof refinement does not exist in the model, a contrast to the results of Wagner et al.
(2015). Furthermore, I show that even the weaker criterion of Neologism proofness has no bite
in the model as it does not exist whenever there are multiple equilibria.
The main model is purposefully kept simple. The principal has either a highly productive
or a less productive technology, the agent can either work or shirk, and observable outcomes
either succeed or fail. The simple 2×2×2 model highlights the tension that arises between the
different types of the principal in an informed-principal moral hazard setting: a less productive
principal never wants to reveal her type to the agent as doing so entails providing the agent with
high-powered incentive schemes. In contrast, a highly productive principal would benefit from
revealing her type to the agent but credibly revealing her private information requires some
form of costly signaling. Equilibrium contracts are determined by the preferences of the highly
productive type who, depending on the agent’s prior belief, chooses to either separate through
costly signaling or to pool with the less productive type. The trade-off between separating
and pooling leads to a tractable geometric characterization of the entire equilibrium payoff-set
which I then use to prove the no-surplus-extraction result.
I also generalize the no-surplus extraction result to a model in which there are T different
types of the principal, L different actions for the agent, N different observable outcomes, and
an arbitrarily finite level of limited liability.1 The impossibility result does not hinge on the
intractable task of characterizing the entire equilibrium payoff-set in the T × L × N model.
Instead, under a sorting assumption, I show that if full-surplus extraction were possible, then
1Wages must be at least w with ∞ < w ≤ 0.
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there would exist a “fictitious” informed principal game between two types of the principal.
The first one has a comparative advantage in providing the work incentives to the agent while
the second type has a comparative advantage in providing the truthfulness incentives to the
principal. The first type would then be solely responsible for incentivizing the agent to work
through bonuses and penalties. However, penalties cannot be too harsh with limited liability.
Thus, the first type is too constrained to be able to extract the entire surplus while also providing
the agent with enough incentives.
Several papers have noted the existence of specific equilibrium outcomes in which an in-
formed principal fails to extract all the surplus. Karle, Schumacher, and Staat (2016) show
that when the principal’s type (private information) and the agent’s efforts are complements,
separating equilibria involve some types of the principal signaling through incentive schemes
that are higher-powered than first-best. In environments with unlimited liability and a produc-
tion technology that violates the full rank condition, Beaudry (1994) shows that the principal
may leave rents to the agent in the form of efficiency wages, and Inderst (2001) establishes that
the principal’s signaling incentives may result in flat or low-powered incentive schemes. These
papers however highlight specific forms of signaling distortions that arise when an informed
principal offers spot-contracts. In contrast, I take a mechanism design approach in which the
principal makes effort recommendations and offers a menu of contingent payments, and I show
that all equilibrium outcomes are distorted away from the first-best.
The mechanism design approach in this paper follows Myerson (1983), Maskin and Tirole
(1990, 1992), Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2012, 2014), and Wagner et al. (2015). This paper is also
related to a larger literature on moral hazard with an informed principal such as Jost (1996),
Chade and Silvers (2002), Mezzetti and Tsoulouhas (2000), Be´nabou and Tirole (2003), Lee and
Fong (2017), and Kaya (2010), which feature double moral hazard problems, risk averse agents,
common agency problems, information acquisition, or dynamic principal-agent relationships.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the 2 × 2 × 2 model of
the principal-agent game. Section 3 characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs and establishes
the impossibility of full-surplus extraction. Section 4 establishes the non-existence of Strongly
Neologism and Neologism proof refinements. Section 5 extends the no-surplus extraction result
to a general T × L×N model. Any proofs skipped from the main text are in the Appendix.
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2 Model
A risk neutral principal (she) contracts with a risk neutral agent (he) to perform a certain task.
The agent can choose either to shirk, e = 0, or to work, e = 1. The contracting environment is
one of hidden action: the principal cannot directly monitor the agent nor can the agent provide
hard evidence of his effort choice.
The only publicly observable/contractible primitive of the model is the Success or Failure of
the undertaken task denoted by x ∈ X , {S, F}. The probability the task succeeds depends on
the agent’s effort e ∈ E , {0, 1} and is given by Pr(x = S|e) = µ× e. The parameter µ ∈ (0, 1)
captures the level of the agent’s productivity or the difficulty of the task. The productivity
parameter can be either high, µ = µH , or low, µ = µL, where µH > µL. Henceforth, I will refer
to θ ∈ Θ , {L,H} as the principal’s type and use µθ to denote the productivity of the agent
when he is matched with a type θ principal.
Given an outcome x ∈ X and wage w ∈ R+, the principal’s payoff is νx − w where νx is
the revenue from outcome x with νS > νF = 0.
2 Similarly, given a wage w ∈ R+ and an effort
choice e ∈ E, the agent’s payoff is w − ce where c > 0 is the cost of effort. I assume that the
agent has limited liability and that both the principal and the agent have a reservation value
of zero. Furthermore, I assume it is efficient for the agent to work for all types of the principal
and for all types to contract with the agent:
µLνS − c ≥ 0. (1)
2.1 Full Information Game
As a baseline, consider the principal-agent game in which the principal’s type is publicly observ-
able. There is a unique equilibrium in which each type θ of the principal extracts the surplus
and earns her first-best payoff vFBθ = µθνS − c. The equilibrium can be implemented by each
2The assumption νF = 0 is made to simplify notation. It is not a normalization as the principal’s reservation
value is normalized to 0. However, none of the results are affected if we only assume that νS > νF as long as
the efficiency assumption (1) is amended to
µL
(
νS − νF
) ≥ max{c, c− νF }.
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type θ offering the agent an outcome contingent payment given by
w(θ, x) =

c
µθ
if x = S
0 if x = F
.
2.2 Informed Principal Game
For the rest of the paper, I consider a principal who privately observes her type θ ∈ Θ. The
agent does not receive any exogenous signal about the principal’s type. Instead, he holds a
commonly known full support prior p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)).3
The principal-agent game is split into two stages: the proposal stage and the continuation
game. In the proposal stage, the principal first learns her type privately and then proposes a
contract C that is comprised of (i) a finite set of messages the principal can send to the agent,
and (ii) payments that are possibly message and outcome dependent. Upon observing the
proposal, the agent updates his belief to a posterior q ∈ ∆(Θ). The proposed contract and the
agent’s posterior together then define a finite perfect-recall extensive-form continuation game
(C, q) as described in Figure 1.4
Principal learns θ
& proposes C
Agent updates
belief to
q ∈ ∆(Θ)
Principal sends
a message
to agent
Agent chooses
e ∈ E
x ∈ X is realized,
payments made
according to C
Proposal
stage
Continuation game
of (C, q)
Figure 1: Timing of principal-agent game.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the principal-agent game specifies a (possibly
random) contract proposal strategy for the principal as well as a posterior belief qC ∈ ∆(Θ)
3∆(Θ) represents the space of all probability measures on Θ. For a belief q ∈ ∆(Θ), supp(q) ⊆ Θ denotes the
support of q. q ∈ int (∆(Θ)) if, and only if, supp(q) = Θ.
4Usually, the agent would also decide to either accept the contract or reject it. However, given limited liability
and costless shirking, the agent can guarantee himself at least his reservation value by accepting any contract.
5
associated with each contract C such that (i) in any continuation game (C, qC), the principal’s
type-dependent messaging strategy and the agent’s message-dependent effort strategy consti-
tute a sequential equilibrium, (ii) given a sequential equilibrium outcome in each continuation
game, the contract proposal strategy for each type of the principal maximizes her payoff, and
(iii) posteriors are derived by Bayes rule whenever possible.
I assume that the players can avail themselves to a public randomization device so that
every continuation game has a convex sequential equilibrium payoff set. I further assume that
for a given contract C, the correspondence from beliefs q to the sequential equilibrium payoff set
of the continuation game (C, q) is upper-hemicontinuous.5 Note that contracts are more general
than direct revelation mechanisms. While it is without loss of generality to only consider the
smaller space of incentive compatible revelation mechanisms on the equilibrium-path, contracts
with richer message spaces allow the principal greater flexibility after deviations.
2.3 Feasible Mechanisms
A (direct revelation) mechanism M , (r, w) is composed of a recommendation policy
r : Θ→ ∆(E)
that maps the principal’s report θˆ ∈ Θ to an effort recommendation e¯ ∈ E with probability
r(e¯|θˆ), and a compensation policy
w : Θ× E ×X → [0, w¯]
that maps the report θˆ ∈ Θ, the realized recommendation e¯ ∈ E, and the observed outcome
x ∈ X to a non-negative wage payment w(θˆ, e¯, x). The upper bound on wages, w¯, is assumed
to be large. The restriction is only made to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium but in
fact can be dropped. There is no need for random compensation policies as both the principal
and agent are risk-neutral.
Suppose the agent obeys the recommendations of a given mechanism M . Then, the princi-
pal’s payoff from reporting θˆ when her true type is θ is given by
V (θˆ; θ,M) =
∑
e¯∈E
r(e¯|θˆ)
(
µθe¯νS − µθe¯w(θˆ, e¯, S)− (1− µθe¯)w(θˆ, e¯, F )
)
.
5Similar restrictions are employed in Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992) and Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2014).
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Similarly, suppose the principal reports her type truthfully. Then, the agent’s payoff when he
holds belief q ∈ ∆(Θ) and employs effort strategy ξ : E → E, a map from recommendation e¯
to effort ξ(e¯), is given by
U(ξ; q,M) =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
e¯∈E
q(θ)r(e¯|θ)
(
µθξ(e¯)w(θ, e¯, S) + (1− µθξ(e¯))w(θ, e¯, F )− c ξ(e¯)
)
.
When the principal reports her type truthfully and the agent obeys the effort recommendations,
I simplify the notation and write V (θ,M) and U(q,M). Notice that the agent’s belief does not
directly affect the principal’s payoff. Instead, it affects the agent’s incentives to obey the
mechanism which in turn affects the principal’s payoff.
Definition 1 Given belief q ∈ ∆(Θ), a mechanism M is q-feasible if it is (i) incentive compat-
ible for the agent to obey recommendations, (ii) incentive compatible for the principal to report
her type truthfully, and (iii) individually rational for each type of the principal:6
i. U(q,M) ≥ U(ξ; q,M), ∀ξ : E → E.
ii. V (θ,M) ≥ V (θˆ; θ,M), ∀θˆ, θ ∈ Θ.
iii. V (θ,M) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
The previous definition of a PBE can now be simplified. First, by the revelation principle,
a sequential equilibrium outcome of any continuation game (C, q) is implementable by some
q-feasible mechanism. Second, by the principle of Inscrutability (Myerson, 1983), any on-path
outcome of the principal-agent game can be implemented by all types proposing the same direct
revelation mechanism.7 Consequently, the agent cannot infer any new information about the
principal’s type from the proposed mechanism.
Definition 2 A mechanism M is a PBE mechanism if (i) M is p0-feasible, and (ii) for any
contract C˜, there exists a belief qC˜ and a sequential equilibrium of the continuation game (C˜, qC˜)
implemented by a qC˜-feasible mechanism M˜ such that V (θ,M) ≥ V (θ, M˜) for all θ ∈ Θ.
6Given limited liability, costless shirking, and a zero reservation value, incentive compatibility for the agent
implies individual rationality.
7The principle of inscrutability does not imply all types will offer the same wages. Instead, the principal
(regardless of type) proposes the same “menu” mechanism that specifies possibly different wage schemes for
each type report. In the continuation stage of the game, each type then makes a report to select the preferred
wage scheme from the menu.
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In the next section, I characterize the set of payoffs that are implementable in equilibrium,
provide a comparative statics result on the equilibrium payoff set as a function of the agent’s
prior, and establish the impossibility of implementing the first-best payoffs in any equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium
To make the equilibrium analysis more tractable, I first simplify the space of feasible mech-
anisms: it is without loss of generality to focus on mechanisms that only recommend work
(e¯ = 1). From the principal’s perspective, asking the agent not to work is equivalent to asking
the agent to work and giving him the entire surplus.
Lemma 1 Fix a belief q ∈ ∆(Θ). For any q-feasible mechanism M , (r, w), there exists
another q-feasible mechanism M˜ , (r˜, w˜) such that for all θ ∈ Θ,
i. r˜(1|θ) = 1, and
ii. V (θ,M) = V (θ, M˜).
Given Lemma 1, I suppress the role of effort recommendations and instead treat mechanisms
as a menu of wages, i.e., M , 〈w(θ, x)〉θ∈Θ,x∈X . For a given belief q ∈ ∆(Θ), a mechanism
M , 〈w(θ, x)〉θ∈Θ,x∈X is q-feasible if it is incentive compatible for the agent to work,∑
Θ
q(θ)µθ
(
w(θ, S)− w(θ, F )) ≥ c, (A-ICq)
and it is incentive compatible for each type of the principal to report truthfully,
µθ
(
w(θˆ, S)− w(θ, S))+ (1− µθ)(w(θˆ, F )− w(θ, F )) ≥ 0 for θˆ 6= θ, (P-ICθ, ∀θ ∈ Θ)
and it is individually rational for each type of the principal,
µθνS − µθw(θ, S)− (1− µθ)w(θ, F ) ≥ 0. (P-IRθ, ∀θ ∈ Θ)
Let M(q) be the space of q-feasible direct revelation mechanisms that only send work recom-
mendations. Specifically,
M(q) ,
{
〈w(θ, x)〉θ∈Θ,x∈X ∈ [0, w¯]4 : 〈w(θ, x)〉θ∈Θ,x∈X satisfies A-ICq, P-ICθ, P-IRθ ∀θ ∈ Θ
}
.
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AsM(q) is the intersection of closed half-spaces, it is a convex and compact subspace of [0, w¯]4.
Furthermore, ∩q∈∆(Θ)M(q) 6= ∅: the mechanism that gives away the firm to the agent with
w(θ, x) = νx, ∀θ ∈ Θ,∀x ∈ X satisfies all the above constraints for any q ∈ ∆(Θ).
Using Lemma 1, any PBE payoff can be implemented by a mechanism inM(p0). However,
other mechanisms may lead to the same equilibrium payoff.8 Hence, it is sometimes more
convenient to work with payoffs rather than mechanisms. Let V(q) ⊆ R2 be the space of
principal-payoff vectors that are implementable by q-feasible mechanisms. Specifically, given a
belief q ∈ ∆(Θ), a payoff vector v ∈ V(q) if, and only if, there exists a q-feasible mechanism M
such that v = (vL, vH) =
(
V (L,M), V (H,M)
)
. As M(q) is a convex and compact subset of
[0, w¯]4 and payoffs are linear and continuous in wages, V(q) is also convex and compact.
In order to characterize the set of PBE payoff vectors, consider a lower bound on type θ’s
payoff given by
max
M
V (θ,M) s.t. M ∈
⋂
q∈∆(Θ)
M(q). (2-θ)
A mechanism M ∈ ⋂q∈∆(Θ)M(q) is feasible regardless of the agent’s belief.9 Any type of
the principal can propose her most preferred mechanism in
⋂
q∈∆(Θ)M(q) and earn the payoff
associated with it regardless of the agent’s beliefs. Thus, each type θ’s payoff in any equilibrium
must be at least as much as the payoff she can earn from the mechanism that solves (2-θ).
The solution to (2-θ) is a mechanism MRSW , 〈w(θ, x)〉θ∈Θ,x∈X with
w(θ, x) x = F x = S
θ = L 0 c
µL
θ = H c(µH−µL)
µH
c(µH−µL)
µH
+ c
µH
Table 1: RSW Mechanism.
The low type pays the agent a large bonus of c
µL
only if he succeeds at the task, whereas the
high type offers the agent an outcome-independent base salary of c(µH−µL)
µH
along with a small
bonus of c
µH
whenever the agent succeeds at the task. Borrowing the terminology of Maskin and
Tirole (1992), I refer to the payoff attained from (2-θ) as the Rothchild-Stiglitz-Wilson payoff,
8For example, even if there may be a unique PBE payoff, it can be implemented by a mechanism M ∈ M(p0)
but also by mechanisms with randomized payments. Hence, while the payoff is unique, the mechanism is not.
9I reformulate (2-θ) as a linear programming problem in the Appendix.
9
denoted by vRSW such that
vRSWθ =

µLνS − c if θ = L
µHνS − c− c(µH−µL)µH if θ = H
.
Let V∗(q) , {v ∈ V(q) : v ≥ vRSW} denote the set of payoffs that are implementable
by q-feasible mechanisms and also dominate the RSW payoff. As mentioned above, any PBE
payoff must yield each type θ at least vRSWθ . Otherwise, type θ can profit by deviating to the
RSW mechanism in Table 1 regardless of the agent’s off-path belief. Therefore, the equilibrium
payoff set is a subset of V∗(p0).
The following proposition states that the equilibrium payoff set is in fact V∗(p0). Further-
more, the equilibrium set expands as the agent becomes more “optimistic” (as the agent’s prior
places relatively more mass on the high type).
Proposition 1 Given a prior p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)), a payoff vector v ∈ R2 is implementable by a
PBE mechanism if, and only if, v ∈ V∗(p0). Furthermore, given any other belief p′0 ∈ ∆(Θ)
with p0(H) < p
′
0(H), V∗(p0) ⊆ V∗(p′0).
Proof. The proof for the necessary condition in the first statement has already been discussed.
The proof for the sufficient condition is a modification of Theorem 1 of Maskin and Tirole
(1992) and is provided in the Appendix. Here, I only provide a proof of the second statement.
Any v ∈ V∗(p0) is implementable by some p0-feasible mechanism M , i.e., V (θ,M) = vθ for
all θ ∈ Θ. By Lemma 1, we can restrict attention to M , 〈w(θ, x)〉θ∈Θ,x∈X ∈ M(p0). As M is
p0-feasible, the agent is willing to work:∑
θ∈Θ
p0(θ)µθ
(
w(θ, S)− w(θ, F )
)
≥ c. (3)
Using vL ≥ vRSWL and Table 1,
c ≥ µL
(
w(L, S)− w(L, F )
)
+ w(L, F )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
by limited liability
≥ µL
(
w(L, S)− w(L, F )
)
.
For (3) to hold, it is then necessary that
µH
(
w(H,S)− w(H,F )
)
≥ c.
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Therefore, for any belief p′0 ∈ ∆(Θ) with p′0(H) > p0(H), we have∑
θ∈Θ
p′0(θ)µθ
(
w(θ, S)− w(θ, F )
)
≥
∑
θ∈Θ
p0(θ)µθ
(
w(θ, S)− w(θ, F )
)
≥ c
establishing p′0-feasibility of M .
10 Hence, the payoff vector
(
V (L,M), V (H,M)
)
= v ∈ V∗(p′0).
Proposition 1 implies that a PBE mechanism always exists: the RSW mechanism. However,
similar to signaling games, there could be multiple equilibria. In the next proposition, I provide
a geometric characterization of the entire equilibrium payoff set.
The following class of payoffs are useful for the characterization: given a belief q ∈ ∆(Θ),
let vpool(q) =
(
vpoolL (q), v
pool
H (q)
) ∈ V(q) be the payoff vector given by
vpoolθ (q) = µθνS −
µθc∑
θ′∈Θ q(θ
′)µθ′
.
It can be implemented by the pooling mechanism Mpool(q) ∈M(q) with wages given by
w(θ, x) x = F x = S
θ = L,H 0 c∑
θ′∈Θ q(θ′)µθ′
Table 2: Pooling Mechanism.
It is straightforward to check that vpool(q) is the highest payoff the principal can get when she
is forced to offer a type-independent q-feasible mechanism.11 Furthermore, vpoolθ (q) is continuous
and strictly increasing in the agent’s belief, i.e., vpool(q′) > vpool(q) if q′(H) > q(H).
Proposition 2 There exists a cutoff belief p∗ ∈ ∆(Θ) such that for any prior p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)),
the equilibrium payoff set V∗(p0) is given by
V∗(p0) =

{vRSW} if p0(H) < p∗(H)
conv
({
vRSW , vpool(p0), v
pool(p∗)
})
if p0(H) ≥ p∗(H)
,
10The principal’s payoff and her incentives to truthfully report are not directly affected by the agent’s beliefs.
As long as the agent works, the principal’s incentives to truthfully report remain unchanged.
11Formally, vpoolθ = maxM∈M(q) V (θ,M) s.t. w(L, x) = w(H,x),∀x ∈ X.
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where conv(·) is the convex hull. The belief p∗ is given by
(
p∗(L), p∗(H)
)
=
(
µH
2µH − µL ,
µH − µL
2µH − µL
)
.
Figure 2a-2c below represent how the equilibrium payoff set V∗(p0) changes as a function
of the agent’s prior. Notice that for p0, p
′
0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)) with p0(H) < p′0(H), V∗(p0) ⊆ V∗(p′0).
vHvRSWH
vRSWL
vL
v¯p0
(a) p0(H) < p
∗(H)
vHvRSWH
vRSWL
vL
v¯p0 = vpool(p∗)
(b) p0(H) = p
∗(H)
vHvRSWH
vRSWL
vL
v¯p0
(c) p0(H) > p
∗(H)
p0(H)
1p∗(H)
vRSWL
vRSWH
θ = H
θ = L
v¯p0θ
(d) Maximal PBE Payoffs.
Figure 2: The green area represents V(p0), payoffs implementable by p0-feasible mechanisms.
The blue area represents V∗(p0), the subset of payoffs implementable by PBE mechanisms.
It is straightforward to see that vRSW  vpool(p∗).12 Thus, an immediate consequences
of Proposition 2 is that there is a unique PBE payoff vector (namely, vRSW ) if, and only if,
p0(H) < p
∗(H).
12Specifically, vRSWL < v
pool
L (p
∗) and vRSWH = v
pool
H (p
∗).
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Corollary 1 For any prior p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)), there is a unique Pareto-dominant PBE payoff
vector v¯p0, i.e., v¯p0 ≥ v for all v ∈ V∗(p0). Furthermore, v¯p0 strictly Pareto dominates all other
p0-feasible payoffs when p0(H) > p
∗(H).13
Proof.
Case 1: p0(H) < p
∗(H).
The result is immediate by setting v¯p0 = vRSW .
Case 2: p0(H) ≥ p∗(H).
vpool(p0) ≥ vpool(p∗) ≥ vRSW . From Proposition 2, v ∈ V∗(p0) = conv
({
vRSW , vpool(p0), v
pool(p∗)
})
.
We get the result by setting v¯p0 = vpool(p0).
Case 3: p0(H) > p
∗(H).
In this case, vpool(p0), v
pool(p∗), and vRSW are not collinear. Thus, V∗(p0) has a non-empty
interior. Furthermore, we have vpool(p0) > v
pool(p∗) ≥ vRSW . Thus, v¯p0 = vpool(p0) > v for all
v ∈ V∗(p0)\{v¯p0}.
Take any v˜ ∈ V(p0)\{v¯p0}. Recall that V(p0) is convex. For any v ∈ int(V∗(p0)) ⊆ V(p0),
there exists an α ∈ (0, 1) such that αv + (1 − α)v˜ ∈ int(V∗(p0)). Since, v¯p0 > v, we have that
αv¯p0 + (1− α)v˜ > αv + (1− α)v˜ ≥ vRSW which implies that αv¯p0 + (1− α)v˜ ∈ V∗(p0). Hence,
v¯p0 > αv¯p0 + (1− α)v˜ which implies that v¯p0 > v˜.
Henceforth, I refer to v¯p0 as the maximal PBE payoff. In Figure 2a-2c above, the maximal
PBE payoff is represented by the north-east vertex of the blue area. Figure 2d depicts how v¯p0
changes as a function of the agent’s prior.
To gain some intuition, recall the full information game in Section 2.1. There is a unique
equilibrium in which type θ earns her first-best payoff vFBθ by recommending the agent to work
and paying him only a bonus of cµθ
for successful outcomes. The low type offers the agent a
larger bonus than the high type to compensate for her lower productivity.
Now consider the case of incomplete information. The low type prefers pooling with the
high type to avoid the large bonus she would otherwise need to offer. In contrast, the high
type faces a trade-off between separating and pooling. If the high type separates, she can offer
a small bonus but credible separation requires “burning money,” e.g., offering a base salary
along with a bonus. If the high type pools with the low type, she must offer a bigger bonus as
pooling dampens the agent’s incentives to work. The more pessimistic the agent, the more his
incentives are dampened by pooling and hence, the bigger his bonus needs to be. If the agent
13Note that the second statement is about all other payoffs in V(p0), not just PBE payoffs in V∗(p0).
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is too pessimistic, pooling is too costly and the high type prefers the separating mechanism in
Table 1. Otherwise, the pooling mechanism in Table 2 is preferable. The cutoff p∗ is the belief
at which the high type is indifferent between separating and pooling.
Similar to the full information case, with unlimited liability, each type of the informed
principal can implement her first-best payoff in equilibrium: Wagner et al. (2015) show that
an informed principal can extract the full surplus in equilibrium if the distribution of output
satisfies the following full rank condition: there exists a vector k ∈ R2 such thatµLe 1− µLe
µHe 1− µHe

k1
k2

is weakly greater than the zero vector with equality for some type θ ∈ Θ when e = 1, and
strictly less than the zero vector when e = 0. The current model satisfies this full rank condition
with k1 = 1 − µL and k2 = −µL. The principal can implement vFB through the mechanism
MWMT = 〈w(θ, x)〉θ∈Θ,x∈X with14
w(θ, x) x = F x = S
θ = L c+ c(1−µL)
p0(L)µL
− c
p0(L)µL
c+ c(1−µL)
p0(L)µL
θ = H c c
Table 3: Full surplus extraction under unlimited liability.
The high type offers a flat wage while the low type offers an incentive scheme that punishes
the agent if he fails at the task. Yet, with limited liability, full surplus extraction is impossible
in any equilibrium of the informed principal-game as shown next.
Proposition 3 For any prior p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)), there exists no equilibrium in which each type
of the principal earns her first-best payoff.
Proof. From Proposition 2, V∗(p0) = {vRSW} when p0(H) < p∗(H), and vRSW 6= vFB. From
Corollary 1, we have v¯p0 = vpool(p0) ≥ v for all v ∈ V∗(p0) when p0(H) ≥ p∗(H). Note that
vFBH = v
pool
H (δH) > v
pool
H (p0) where δθ ∈ ∆(Θ) is the degenerate belief that the principal’s type
14WMT for Wagner, Mylovanov, and Tro¨ger.
14
is θ.15 In either case, vFB /∈ V∗(p0).
Under full information, each type of the principal only needs to provide incentives for
the agent to work. In contrast, if the principal has private information, conflicting signaling
incentives among the different types ensue; one type of the principal prefers to reveal the private
information while another type prefers otherwise. Hence, each type now faces an additional
constraint to be truthful.
When the full rank condition holds and there is unlimited liability, the conflicting signaling
incentives can be resolved by the different types “trading” the cost of satisfying the agent’s
work incentive constraint (A-IC) for the cost of satisfying the principal’s truthful reporting
constraint (P-IC). In particular, the low type of the principal bears the cost of satisfying A-IC
(as evidenced in Table 3) because she has a “comparative advantage ” in punishing the agent
for failure, i.e., 1− µL > 1− µH . On the other hand, the high type bears the cost of satisfying
P-IC as she has no incentives to mimic the low type. However, such a trade involves the low
type severely punishing the agent for failed outcomes which is infeasible with limited liability.
4 Refinements
A natural focal point to resolve the multiplicity problem is the unique maximal PBE payoff
vector, v¯p0 . This section discuss how it relates to two frequently used refinements in the informed
principal literature: Strongly Neologism proofness (Mylovanov and Tro¨ger, 2012) and Neologism
proofness (Farrell, 1993; Grossman and Perry, 1986).
4.1 Strongly Neologism Proofness
The first refinement I consider is Strongly Neologism proofness (SNP). Given two payoff vectors
v and v˜, let S(v, v˜) be the set of types that strictly prefer v to v˜:
S(v, v˜) = {θ ∈ Θ : vθ > v˜θ}.
Definition 3 A payoff vector v ∈ V(p0) is implementable by a Strongly Neologism proof mech-
anism if there exists no belief q ∈ ∆(Θ) along with a payoff vector v˜ ∈ V(q) satisfying:
(a) S(v, v˜) ∩ supp(q) = ∅, and
15δθ(θˆ) = 1 if θˆ = θ and 0 otherwise.
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(b) S(v˜, v) ∩ supp(q) 6= ∅.
In words, a p0-feasible mechanism M is SNP if there is no deviation mechanism M˜ that is
feasible given the agent believes (a) types that strictly prefer M to M˜ do not deviate, and (b)
some types that strictly prefer M˜ to M do deviate. The next lemma establishes that if an SNP
mechanism exists, then it necessarily implements the maximal PBE payoff vector v¯p0 .
Lemma 2 If a payoff vector v ∈ V(p0) is implementable by a Strongly Neologism proof mech-
anism, then v = v¯p0.
Roughly, all types of the principal would (weakly) prefer to swap any PBE mechanism
for some mechanism M¯p0 that implements the maximal PBE payoff vector v¯p0 . Even if the
agent considers M¯p0 an-off path mechanism under some equilibrium, he should recognize that
either type of the principal is likely to deviate to it. Therefore, such a deviation should be
uninformative of the principal’s type.
Proposition 4 For any prior p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)), there exists no Strongly Neologism Proof mech-
anism.
Proof. Fix any prior p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)). Suppose there exists an SNP mechanism. By Lemma 2,
the SNP mechanism must implement payoff vector v¯p0 .
Take any other belief q ∈ int(∆(Θ)) such that
max{p∗(H), p0(H)} < q(H) < 1.
Such a q exists: full support of the prior implies p0(H) < 1, and p
∗(H) = µH−µL
2µH−µL < 1. Also,
v¯p0 ∈ V∗(p0) ⊆ V∗(q) ⊆ V(q)
where the first set inclusion follows by applying the comparative statics result in Proposition 1 to
q(H) > p0(H), and the second set inclusion follows by construction. Had the agent’s prior been
q instead of p0, the unique maximal q-feasible PBE payoff vector would be v¯
q. Furthermore,
v¯q > v¯p0 by Corollary 1 because q(H) > p∗(H).
Therefore, we have (a) S(v¯p0 , v¯q) = ∅, and (b) S(v¯q, v¯p0) = supp(q) = Θ. However, this
contradicts the supposition that v¯p0 is implementable by an SNP mechanism.
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Similar to the negative result of Proposition 3, the non-existence result of an SNP mecha-
nism is a direct consequence of limited liability. Under unlimited liability, Wagner et al. (2015)
show that the first-best payoff is implementable by an SNP mechanism.
Admittedly, Strongly Neologism proofness is a demanding refinement criterion because it
places little structure on the agent’s off-path beliefs. For example, consider a deviation from
some PBE mechanism implementing payoff v ∈ V∗(p0) to some other off-path contract C.
Upon observing the deviation, the agent changes his prior to an off-path belief q ∈ ∆(Θ). The
deviation leads to the continuation game (C, q) which results in the deviation payoff vector
v˜ ∈ V(q). Suppose the high type strictly prefers the deviation payoff (v˜H > vH) while the low
type is indifferent (v˜L = vL). We would intuitively expect that the high type is more likely to
make the deviation. However, upon observing such a deviation, the definition of SNP permits
the agent’s off-path belief to place almost no mass on the high type, i.e., q(H) =  > 0 with 
small, even though such a posterior can only be justified by Bayesian updating if the high type
is relatively less likely to deviate.
The next section explores if the additional structure imposed by Neologism proofness fares
better as a refinement in the current model. Unfortunately, the answer remains no.
4.2 Neologism Proofness
Similar to SNP, Neologism proofness restricts the agent’s off-path belief by placing no mass
on the types that strictly lose after a deviation. Additionally, Neologism proofness restricts
the agent’s off-path belief to place relatively more mass on the types that strictly gain after a
deviation.
Definition 4 A payoff vector v ∈ V(p0) is implementable by a Neologism proof mechanism if
there exists no belief q ∈ ∆(Θ) along with a payoff vector v˜ ∈ V(q) satisfying:
(a) S(v, v˜) ∩ supp(q) = ∅, and
(b)
q(θ)
p0(θ)
≥ q(θ′)p0(θ′) for all θ ∈ S(v˜, v) and all θ′ ∈ Θ.
While Neologism proofness is a weaker refinement criteria than SNP, the next proposition
shows that it has no bite in the current model− a Neologism proof mechanism does not exist
precisely when there are multiple PBE payoff vectors.
Proposition 5 For any prior p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)) with p0(H) ≥ p∗(H), there exists no Neologism
proof mechanism.
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Proof. Suppose a Neologism proof mechanism exists. By the same argument as Lemma 2,
it has to implement the maximal PBE payoff vector v¯p0 . Fix any prior p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)) with
p0(H) ≥ p∗(H). Then, v¯p0 = vpool(p0) and it can be implemented by the pooling mechanism
given in Table 2.
Consider a deviation to a mechanism M˜ , 〈w˜(θ, x)〉θ∈Θ,x∈X with
w˜(θ, x) x = F x = S
θ = L 0 c∑
θ′∈Θ p0(θ′)µθ′
θ = H p0(L)µL∑
θ′∈Θ p0(θ′)µθ′
(
c(µH−µL)
µH
)
p0(L)µL∑
θ′∈Θ p0(θ′)µθ′
(
c(µH−µL)
µH
)
+ c
µH
Table 4: Mechanism M˜ .
along with a degenerate off-path belief that the principal is the high type, i.e, q = δH . We can
think of the mechanism M˜ as a random mechanism that implements vRSW with probability
p0(L)µL∑
θ′∈Θ p0(θ′)µθ′
and vpool(δH) with probability
p0(H)µH∑
θ′∈Θ p0(θ′)µθ′
, as can be seen in the Figure 3 below.
vHvRSWH
vRSWL
vL
v˜v¯p0
vpool(δH)
Figure 3: The purple area represents V∗(p0) while the pink area represents V∗(δH). The arrow
represents the deviation from v¯p0 to v˜.
The mechanism M˜ is δH-feasible: If the principal reports honestly, the agent is willing to
obey the recommendation as the payoff difference between working and shirking is
µH
(
w˜(H,S)− w˜(H,F )
)
− c = 0.
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If the agent is obedient, all types of the principal are willing to report honestly as
V (L, M˜) = µLνS − cµL∑
θ′∈Θ p0(θ
′)µθ′
= V (H;L, M˜)
and
V (H, M˜) =µHνS − c− p0(L)µL∑
θ′∈Θ p0(θ
′)µθ′
(
c(µH − µL)
µH
)
>µHνS − cµH∑
θ′∈Θ p0(θ
′)µθ′
=V (L;H, M˜).
Hence, the mechanism M˜ implements payoff v˜ =
(
V (L, M˜), V (H, M˜)
)
∈ V(δH).
Furthermore, some simple algebra shows that v˜L = v
pool
L (p0) = v¯
p0
L and v˜H > v
pool
H (p0) = v¯
p0
H .
Thus, S(v¯p0 , v˜) = ∅ and S(v˜, v¯p0) = {H}. Since
δH(H)
p0(H)
>
δH(L)
p0(L)
= 0,
we have found a belief δH along with a payoff vector v˜ ∈ V(δH) that satisfies (a)-(b) of Defi-
nition 4. However, this contradicts the supposition that v¯p0 is implementable by a Neologism
proof mechanism when p0(H) ≥ p∗(H).
5. Generalization
In this section, I consider a T -types×L-actions×N -outcomes model and show a general impos-
sibility result that extends Proposition 3 under a “sorting assumption”: for any finite level of
limited liability w ∈ (∞, 0], there exists a set of priors for which full surplus extraction is not
possible. Furthermore, this set of priors expands as w increases to zero.
Let Θ , {θ1, θ2, . . . , θT} be the different types of the principal, and let p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ))
denote the agent’s prior. Let E , {e1, e2, . . . , eL} be the agent’s effort space with associated
costs 0 = c1 < c2 < . . . < cL. Let ν = (νn)
N
n=1 be the profit vector for the principal from N
outcomes with ν1 < ν2 < . . . < νN . The outside options for both the agent and the principal
are normalized to 0.
Given a principal of type θt ∈ Θ and an effort choice el ∈ E, let µ(θt, el) =
(
µn(θt, el)
)N
n=1
be the probability vector of outcomes (the production function) where µn(θt, el) represents the
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probability of realizing profit level νn. Given a wage vector w = (wn)
N
n=1, the principal’s payoff
is given by µ(θt, el) · (ν − w) while the agent’s payoff is given by µ(θt, el) · w − cl. I assume
that the principal faces some finite level of limited liability w ∈ (−∞, 0] so that wn ≥ w for
n = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Let S(θt, el) = µ(θt, el) · ν − cl be the surplus generated between a principal of type θt and
an agent who chooses action el. Below, I extend (1) by assuming that there is a single efficient
action el∗ (not necessarily the costliest action) for all types of the principal.
A1: Efficiency
There exists some action el∗ with l
∗ > 1 such that for all θt ∈ Θ,
i. S∗t , S(θt, el∗) > S(θt, el) for all l 6= l∗, and
ii. S∗t ≥ 0.
Consider a (direct revelation) mechanism M , 〈w(θt)〉Tt=1 in which each type θt ∈ Θ recom-
mends effort el∗ and offers the wage vector w(θt) ∈ [w, w¯]N . If the agent obeys the effort
recommendation, the principal’s payoff from reporting θtˆ when her true type is θt is given by
V (tˆ; t,M) =µ(θt, el∗) ·
(
ν −w(θtˆ)
)
.
Similarly, if the principal reports her type truthfully, the agent’s payoff when he holds belief
q ∈ ∆(Θ) and chooses effort el is given by
U(l; q,M) =
T∑
t=1
q(θt)µ(θt, el) ·w(θt)− cl.
When the principal reports her type truthfully and the agent obeys the effort recommendation
of el∗ , I simplify the notation and write V (t,M) and U(q,M). Given belief q ∈ ∆(Θ), the
mechanism M is q-feasible if
U(q,M) ≥ U(l; q,M), ∀l = 1, 2, . . . , L, (A-IClq)
U(q,M) ≥ 0, (A-IRq)
V (t,M) ≥ V (tˆ; t,M), ∀tˆ, t = 1, 2, . . . , T, and (P-ICtˆt)
V (t,M) ≥ 0, ∀t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (P-IRt)
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The inequalities are the agent’s incentive compatibility, agent’s individual rationality, the prin-
cipal’s incentive (truthful reporting) compatibility, and the principal’s rationality constraints.
In contrast to Section 3, I do not seek to characterize the entire equilibrium payoff set in
the T ×L×N model. Instead, in Lemma 3 below, I provide a necessary and sufficient condition
under which first-best surplus extraction is possible by all types of the principal. However, as
I show in Proposition 6, the necessary conditions cannot be satisfied for all prior beliefs when
a sorting condition holds.
Lemma 3
For a given prior p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)), there exists a first-best equilibrium mechanism M with
V (t,M) = S∗t for each t = 1, 2, . . . , T if, and only if, there exist vectors kt = (k
n
t )
N
n=1 for
t = 1, 2, . . . , T such that
i. µ(θt, el∗) · kt = 0 for each t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
ii. µ(θt, el∗) · ktˆ ≥ 0 for each tˆ 6= t and each t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
iii.
∑T
t=1 p0(θt)µ(θt, el) · kt ≤ cl − cl∗ for each l 6= l∗, and
iv. knt ≥ w − cl∗ for each t = 1, 2, . . . , T and each n = 1, 2, . . . , N .
The conditions of Lemma 3 apply for any level of liability including unlimited liability.16
As a result, these conditions subsume the sufficient full rank conditions in Wagner et al. (2015)
for the case of a single efficient action.
In the 2 × 2 × 2 model, (a) working is (weakly) more productive than shirking, regardless
of the principal’s type, and (b) the high type is (weakly) more productive than the low type,
regardless of the agent’s action. In the current T × L×N model, the production function still
lacks structure that would allow us to say much about the equilibrium outcomes. The sorting
condition below adds some structure and can be interpreted as establishing a “preferred type”
θt∗ and a “preferred action” which coincides with the efficient action el∗ .
A2: Sorting
There exists a type θt∗ such that for some vector y ∈ RN ,[
µ(θt∗ , el∗)− µ(θt, el∗)
] · y ≥ 0, ∀t 6= t∗ =⇒ [µ(θt∗ , el∗)− µ(θt∗ , el′)] · y ≥ 0 for some l′ < l∗.
16When w = −∞, the last inequality constraints in Lemma 3 are trivially satisfied.
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In other words, if it is worthwhile to take the efficient action when working for the preferred
type than when working for any other type, then taking the efficient action when working for
the preferred type must be at least as good as taking a less costly action.
To gain some intuition, suppose that higher actions and higher types lead to more favorable
distributions over outcomes, i.e., µ(θt, el) first-order stochastically dominates µ(θt′ , el′) when-
ever t > t′ or l > l′. Consider some random outcome that takes values y1 ≤ y2 ≤ . . . ≤ yN .
Then, “working” (exerting the efficient level of effort) for the “preferred type” θT yields a
higher expected outcome than working for any other type, i.e., µ(θT , el∗) · y ≥ µ(θt, el∗) · y for
all t < T . Furthermore, “working” for the “preferred type” yields a higher expected outcomes
than “shirking”, i.e., µ(θT , el∗) · y ≥ µ(θT , e1) · y. The sorting condition expands the same
intuition to the case when y is not an increasing vector.
Example 1: Suppose N = 2. The sorting condition is satisfied for t∗ = T if µ(θt, el) first-order
stochastically dominates µ(θt′ , el′) whenever t > t
′ or l > l′. The 2× 2× 2 model of Section 3
is a special case of this example.
Example 2: Let µ¯ = (µ¯n)
N
n=1 and µ = (µn)
N
n=1 be two production functions such that µ¯
first-order stochastically dominates µ. Let λ : Θ× E → [0, 1]. Suppose µ(θt, el) = λ(θt, el)µ¯+(
1− λ(θt, el)
)
µ. The sorting condition is satisfied if λ(θt, el) increases in t and l. The spanning
condition in Grossman and Hart (1983) is a special case of this example in which λ is type-
independent.
Proposition 6
Assume (A1) and (A2) hold. For any finite level of limited liability w ∈ (−∞, 0], there exists a
non-empty set of beliefs
P(w) ,
{
q ∈ int(∆(Θ)) : q(θt∗) > cl∗−1 − w
cl∗ − w
}
such that for any prior p0 ∈ P(w), there exists no PBE mechanism M with V (t,M) = S∗t for
each t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
Remark 1: For w < w′, P(w) ⊆ P(w′).
Remark 2: For w = cl∗−1, P(w) ≡ int
(
∆(Θ)
)
. As the model in Section 2 satisfies w = c1 = 0,
the impossibility result of Proposition 3 is a special case of Proposition 6.
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The proof of Proposition 6 first establishes that if first-best surplus extraction is possible,
under (A1) and (A2), there necessarily exists a “fictitious” surplus extraction problem with just
two types, θt∗ and θt′ with t
′ 6= t∗. Similar to the 2×2×2 model, types θt∗ and θt′ “trade” the cost
of satisfying the agent’s incentive constraint with the cost of satisfying the principal’s incentive
constraint. Specifically, the preferred type θt∗ has a comparative advantage in satisfying the
principal’s incentive constraint. Type θt′ has a comparative advantage in satisfying the agent’s
incentive compatibility constraint, and thus, bears the entire cost of A-ICl
′
p0
for some l′ < l∗.
However, if the agent’s prior places a low enough probability on type θt′ , the agent’s incen-
tives to choose el∗ over el′ are too weak. Nonetheless, with unlimited liability, the agent’s low
belief can be off-set by arbitrarily harsh punishments for low profit levels. In contrast, with
limited liability, this off-setting is not always possible as the punishments cannot be too harsh.
Furthermore, as the lower bound on wages increases, the principal becomes more constrained
by how harshly she can punish the agent. Therefore, the set of beliefs for which she cannot
extract the first-best-surplus expands.
Proof of Proposition 6. Fix some finite level of limited liability w ∈ (−∞, 0] and a prior
p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)). If there exists a first-best-surplus extracting equilibrium mechanism M , there
necessarily exist vectors {kt}Tt=1 with kt ∈ RN that satisfy conditions i− iv of Lemma 3. Using
i and ii of Lemma 3, for each t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
0 = µ(θt, el∗) · (−kt) ≥ µ(θtˆ, el∗) · (−kt), ∀tˆ 6= t
which, from (A.2), implies that there exists a type t∗ such that
0 = µ(θt∗ , el∗) · (−kt∗) ≥ µ(θt∗ , el′) · (−kt∗) (4)
for some l′ < l∗. Pick some t′ 6= t∗. The vectors kt∗ and kt′ satisfy
cl′ − cl∗ ≥
T∑
t=1
p0(θt)µ(θt, el′) · kt
≥(1− p0(θt′)− p0(θt∗))(w − cl∗) + p0(θt′)µ(θt′ , el′) · kt′ + p0(θt∗)µ(θt∗ , el′) · kt∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by (4)
≥(1− p0(θt′)− p0(θt∗))(w − cl∗) + p0(θt′)µ(θt′ , el′) · kt′
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where the first inequality follows from iii of Lemma 3, and the second inequality follows from
knt ≥ w − cl∗ by iv of Lemma 3. Also from iv of Lemma 3, we have µ(θt′ , el′) · kt′ ≥ w − cl∗ .
Therefore,
w − cl∗ ≤ µ(θt′ , el′) · kt′ ≤
cl′ − w +
(
p0(θt′) + p0(θt∗)
)
(w − cl∗)
p0(θt′)
which can be rearranged to get p0(θt∗) ≤ cl′−wcl∗−w ≤
cl∗−1−w
cl∗−w .
However, any p0 ∈ P(w) violates this last inequality, thereby violating the necessary con-
ditions in Lemma 3 for full-surplus extraction.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Take any q-feasible mechanismM , (r, w) and let v =
(
V (L,M), V (H,M)
)
.
Construct a new mechanism M˜ , (r˜, w˜) such that for all θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ X,
(i) r˜(1|θ) = 1,
(ii) w˜(θ, 0, x) = 0, and
(iii) w˜(θ, 1, x) = r(1|θ)w(θ, 1, x) + r(0|θ)
(
w(θ, 0, F ) + νx
)
.
If the principal reports her type honestly, the agent is willing to follow the work recommendation
as his payoff difference from working versus shirking is
∑
θ∈Θ
q(θ)
{
µθ
(
w˜(θ, 1, S)− w˜(θ, 1, F )
)
− c
}
=
∑
θ∈Θ
q(θ)r(1|θ)
{
µθ
(
w(θ, 1, S)− w(θ, 1, F )
)
− c
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
by q-feasibility of M
+
∑
θ∈Θ
q(θ)r(0|θ)
{
µθνS − c
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
by (1)
≥ 0.
If the agent is obedient, then for all θ, θˆ ∈ Θ
V (θˆ; θ, M˜) =µθνS − µθw˜(θˆ, 1, S)− (1− µθ)w˜(θˆ, 1, F )
=µθνS − µθ
{
r(1|θˆ)w(θˆ, 1, S) + r(0|θˆ)[w(θˆ, 0, F ) + νS]}
− (1− µθ)
{
r(1|θˆ)w(θˆ, 1, F ) + r(0|θˆ)w(θˆ, 0, F )
}
=
∑
e¯∈E
r(e¯|θˆ)
{
µθe¯νS − µθe¯w(θˆ, e¯, S)− (1− µθe¯)w(θˆ, e¯, F )
}
=V (θˆ; θ,M)
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and truthful reporting remains incentive compatible for all types of the principal under M˜ .
Thus, M˜ satisfies A-ICq and P-ICθ for all θ ∈ Θ and implements the payoff v ≥ 0, i.e., M˜ is
q-feasible.
Linear program for RSW mechanism
The problem in (2-θ) can be reformulated as minimizing average wage payments over deter-
ministic wage schemes W , 〈W xθ 〉θ∈Θ,x∈X ∈ [0, w¯]4 with W xθ = w(θ, x). In other words, (2-θ) is
equivalent to
min
W∈[0,w¯]4
µθW
S
θ + (1− µθ)W Fθ (2′-θ)
s.t.
∑
θ′∈Θ
q(θ′)µθ′
(
W Sθ′ −W Fθ′
) ≥ c, (A-ICq, ∀q ∈ ∆(Θ))
µθ′
(
W Sθ′′ −W Sθ′
)
+ (1− µθ′)
(
W Fθ′′ −W Fθ′
)
≥ 0, ∀θ′′ ∈ Θ (P-ICθ′ , ∀θ′ ∈ Θ)
µθ′νS − µθ′W Sθ′ − (1− µθ′)W Fθ′ ≥ 0. (P-IRθ′ , ∀θ′ ∈ Θ)
I relax the above linear program by dropping the P-IRθ constraints. Furthermore, notice that
if some given wage scheme W ∈ [0, w¯]4 satisfies both A-ICδH and A-ICδL , it also satisfies A-ICq
for all q ∈ ∆(Θ). Let vRSWθ be the payoff attained from minimizing type θ’s expected wage
payments in the following relaxed linear program with four constraints:
min
W∈[0,w¯]4
µθW
S
θ + (1− µθ)W Fθ (2′′-θ)
s.t. µθ′
(
W Sθ′ −W Fθ′
) ≥ c, (A-ICδθ′ , ∀θ′ ∈ Θ)
µθ′
(
W Sθ′′ −W Sθ′
)
+ (1− µθ′)
(
W Fθ′′ −W Fθ′
)
≥ 0, ∀θ′′ ∈ Θ. (P-ICθ′ , ∀θ′ ∈ Θ)
Notice that the constraint set for program (2′′-θ) is independent of the principal’s type θ and
the agent’s belief q. The only difference between (2′′-H) and (2′′-L) is the objective function
we want to minimize. The wage scheme in Table 1 solves both programs, and satisfies all the
constraints of (2′-θ).
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof for sufficiency closely follows Theorem 1 of Maskin and
Tirole (1992) and is a consequence of the next two lemmas.
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Lemma 4 There exists a belief q∗ ∈ int(∆(Θ)) such that vRSW is q∗-undominated, i.e., there
exists no payoff v ∈ V(q∗) such that vθ ≥ vRSWθ for all θ ∈ Θ and strictly for at least one type.
Proof. For some weight ω ∈ (0, 1), consider the program
min
W∈[0,w¯]4
ω
(
µLW
S
L + (1− µL)W FL
)
+ (1− ω)
(
µHW
S
H + (1− µH)W FH
)
(5)
s.t. µθ
(
W Sθ −W Fθ
) ≥ c, (A-ICδθ , ∀θ ∈ Θ)
µθ
(
W Sθ′ −W Sθ
)
+ (1− µθ)
(
W Fθ′ −W Fθ
)
≥ 0, ∀θ′ ∈ Θ. (P-ICθ, ∀θ ∈ Θ)
The constraint set of (5) is equivalent to that of (2′′-θ). Furthermore, (2′′-H) and (2′′-L)
correspond to the cases ω = 0 and ω = 1 respectively. As the RSW wage scheme from
Table 1, denoted by WRSW , solves both (2′′-H) and (2′′-L), it also solves (5) for any ω ∈ (0, 1).
Additionally, WRSW along with the associated Lagrange multipliers is a strictly complementary
solution to the primal-dual problems of (5).
At the wages prescribed by WRSW , both A-ICδH and A-ICδL bind. Let ϕ
ω
θ be the strictly
positive multiplier associated with A-ICδθ for a given ω ∈ (0, 1). Construct a full support belief
qω ∈ ∆(Θ) such that
qω(θ) =
ϕωθ∑
θ′∈Θ ϕ
ω
θ′
.
Fix the weight at some ω∗ ∈ (0, 1), and let q∗ ≡ qω∗ and ϕ∗θ ≡ ϕω∗θ . Now consider the program
min
W∈[0,w¯]4
ω∗
(
µLW
S
L + (1− µL)W FL
)
+ (1− ω∗)
(
µHW
S
H + (1− µH)W FH
)
(5′)
s.t.
∑
θ∈Θ
q∗(θ)µθ
(
W Sθ −W Fθ
) ≥ c, (A-ICq∗)
µθ
(
W Sθ′ −W Sθ
)
+ (1− µθ)
(
W Fθ′ −W Fθ
)
≥ 0, ∀θ′ ∈ Θ. (P-ICθ, ∀θ ∈ Θ)
A solution to (5′) is a point on the Pareto-frontier of q∗-feasible mechanisms, i.e., a mechanism
implementing a q∗-undominated payoff vector. We can see that the Lagrangian of (5) and
(5′) coincide at WRSW by setting the multiplier associated with (A-ICq∗) to
∑
θ′∈Θ ϕ
∗
θ′ . Thus,
WRSW is also a solution to program (5′) and vRSW is q∗-undominated.
Let V , cl
(
conv
(⋃
q∈∆(Θ) V(q)
))
be the convex closure of all feasible payoffs. For any payoff
28
vector v ∈ V , there is a (random) direct revelation mechanism that can implement v.17
Fix a contract C. Let Γ(C, ·) : ∆(Θ) → V be the payoff correspondence so that Γ(C, q) is the
set of principal-payoff vectors sustained by a sequential equilibrium of the continuation game
(C, q). As already mentioned in the text, I assume that Γ(C, q) is non-empty, convex, and
upper-hemicontinuous. Furthermore, Γ(C, q) ⊆ V(q) by the revelation principle.
Fix an  ∈ (0, 1) and let
Aθ(v) = arg max
a∈[,1]
avθ + (1− a)vRSWθ ,
and let A(v) , AL(v) × AH(v). A vector (αL, αH) = α ∈ A(v) gives the probabilities with
which each type of the principal chooses payoff vector v over vRSW with the constraint that
each type must choose v at least with probability  > 0.
Let Q : [, 1]2 → ∆(Θ) be a mapping from a given choice probability vector α ∈ [, 1]2 and
the belief q∗ from Lemma 4 to a Bayes-updated posterior belief Q(α) ∈ int(∆(Θ)) with
Q(θ;α) = q
∗(θ)αθ∑
θ′∈Θ q
∗(θ′)αθ′
.
Define the correspondence T C that maps V × [, 1]2 ×∆(Θ) to itself:
T C(v, α, q) = Γ(C, q)×A(v)×Q(α).
The correspondence T C is upper-hemicontinuous, convex-valued, and closed. Therefore, it has
a fixed point, (v, α, q).
For intuition, consider the following iterative process for a given contract C: Pick an arbitrary
belief q1 ∈ ∆(Θ) which defines the continuation game (C, q1). Pick a sequential equilibrium
payoff vector v1 ∈ Γ(C, q1). Pick a choice probability α1 ∈ A(v1) which describes the principal’s
optimal behavior when choosing between v1 and vRSW . Based on this behavior, the agent
updates his belief from q∗ to q2 = Q(α1) ∈ ∆(Θ). We now have a different continuation game
(C, q2). Pick a new sequential equilibrium payoff vector v2 ∈ Γ(C, q2) and a new probability
α2 ∈ A(v2) of choosing v2 over vRSW . Based on this behavior, the agent updates his belief
from q∗ to q3 = Q(α2) ∈ ∆(Θ). And so on.
The fixed point (v, α, q) is interpreted as follows: each type θ deviates from the RSW mecha-
nism to the contract C with probability αθ ≥  > 0. Based on this behavior, the agent updates
his belief from q∗ to q. This results in the continuation game (C, q) and the subsequent se-
17If the mechanism is random, we can use the public randomization device to coordinate beliefs.
29
quential equilibrium outcome of the continuation game v ∈ Γ(C, q). Based on this outcome,
type θ’s constrained choice of deviating from the RSW mechanism to C is optimal.
Lemma 5 For any contract C, there exists a belief q ∈ ∆(Θ) and a payoff vector v ∈ Γ(C, q)
such that vRSW ≥ v.
Proof. Suppose not! Then, there exists a contract C such that for all beliefs q ∈ ∆(Θ) and all
payoffs v ∈ Γ(C, q), some type of the principal strictly prefers v to vRSW : S(v, vRSW ) 6= ∅.18
Construct a fixed point (v, α, q) for  > 0 as described above and let
(v0, α0, q0) = lim
→0
(v, α, q).
The limit is well defined: ∀q ∈ ∆(Θ) and ∀v ∈ Γ(C, q), S(v, vRSW ) 6= ∅ implies
0 /∈ lim
→0
⋃
q∈∆(Θ)
⋃
v∈Γ(C,q)
A(v).
Thus, q0 is a well-defined probability distribution over Θ . As v0 ∈ Γ(C, q0) ⊆ V(q0), it is imple-
mentable by a q0-feasible mechanism that always recommends work. Let W 0 = 〈W 0,xθ 〉θ∈Θ,x∈X
be the wage scheme associated with such a q0-feasible mechanism.
Construct a new wage scheme W˜ = 〈W˜ xθ 〉θ∈Θ,x∈X with W˜ xθ = α0θW 0,xθ + (1 − α0θ)WRSW,xθ . The
new wage scheme is q∗-feasible. The agent is willing to work as A-ICq∗ is satisfied:∑
θ∈Θ
q∗(θ)µθ
(
W˜ Sθ − W˜ Fθ
)
=
(∑
θ′∈Θ
q∗(θ′)α0θ′
)∑
θ∈Θ
q∗(θ)α0θ∑
θ′∈Θ q
∗(θ′)α0θ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
=q0(θ)
µθ
(
W 0,Sθ −W 0,Fθ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥c
by q0-feasibility of W 0
+
(∑
θ′∈Θ
q∗(θ′)(1− α0θ′)
)∑
θ∈Θ
q∗(θ)(1− α0θ)∑
θ′∈Θ q
∗(θ′)(1− α0θ′)
µθ
(
WRSW,Sθ −WRSW,Fθ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥c
by q-feasibility of WRSW ∀q∈∆(Θ)
≥ c.
18S(v˜, v) = {θ ∈ Θ : v˜θ > vθ} as defined in Section 4.1.
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The principal is willing to report truthfully as P-ICθ is satisfied for all θ ∈ Θ:
µθ
(
W˜ Sθ′ − W˜ Sθ
)
+ (1− µθ)
(
W˜ Fθ′ − W˜ Fθ
)
= α0θ′
[
µθW
0,S
θ′ + (1− µθ)W 0,Fθ′
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥µθW 0,Sθ +(1−µθ)W 0,Fθ
by q0-feasibility of W 0
+(1− α0θ′)
[
µθW
RSW,S
θ′ + (1− µθ)WRSW,Fθ′
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥µθWRSW,Sθ +(1−µθ)WRSW,Fθ
by q-feasibility of WRSW ∀q∈∆(Θ)
−α0θ
[
µθW
0,S
θ + (1− µθ)W 0,Fθ
]
− (1− α0θ)
[
µθW
RSW,S
θ + (1− µθ)WRSW,Fθ
]
≥
[
µθW
0,S
θ + (1− µθ)W 0,Fθ − µθWRSW,Sθ − (1− µθ)WRSW,Fθ
]
(α0θ′ − α0θ) ≥ 0,
where the first inequality holds because the wage scheme W 0 is q0-feasible and WRSW is feasible
regardless of the agent’s belief, and the second inequality holds because αθ is type θ’s optimal
choice probability between W 0 and WRSW .
Let v˜ ∈ V(q∗) be the payoff implemented by W˜ . By construction,
v˜ = α0 · v0 + (1− α0) · vRSW ≥ vRSW .
However, this contradicts the conclusion of Lemma 4 that vRSW is q∗-undominated.
Now we can prove the sufficient condition of Proposition 1. Fix any prior p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)) and
take any payoff vector v ∈ V∗(p0). By definition, v ≥ vRSW . From Lemma 5, for any deviation
C˜, there exists a belief q˜ ∈ ∆(Θ) and a payoff v˜ ∈ Γ(C˜, q˜) ⊆ V(q˜) such that vRSW ≥ v˜. Hence,
for any off-path contract proposal, there is a belief that makes the deviation unprofitable for
all types of the principal.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since V(p0) is a convex polygon, so is V∗(p0).19 Therefore, I just
19Recall that V∗(p0) = {v ∈ V(p0) : v ≥ vRSW }.
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need to characterize the extreme points, which is given by solving the following linear program
max
W∈[0,w¯]4
ωL
(
µLW
S
L + (1− µL)W FL
)
+ ωH
(
µHW
S
H + (1− µH)W FH
)
(Program 6-ω)
s.t.
∑
θ∈Θ
p0(θ)µθ
(
W Sθ −W Fθ
)
≥ c, (A-ICp0)
µθ
(
W Sθ′ −W Sθ
)
+ (1− µθ)
(
W Fθ′ −W Fθ
)
≥ 0, ∀θ′ ∈ Θ, (P-ICθ, ∀θ)
µθνS − µθW Sθ − (1− µθ)W Fθ ≥ vRSWθ . (PBEθ, ∀θ)
as the weights ω = (ωL, ωH) vary over R2\{(0, 0)}. Notice that the principal’s payoff is now
bounded below by vRSW instead of the outside option.
For ω > 0, it is clear that the maximum is attained when the PBEθ constraints bind for all
θ ∈ Θ. Hence, the solution is given by the RSW wages in Table 1. In fact, when p0(H) < p∗(H),
this is the only solution for all weights ω 6= 0. When p0(H) ≥ p∗(H), the solution is summarized
in Figure 4 below.
ωL
ωH
vRSW
vRSW
v
p
o
o
l(p
0 )
vpool(p0)
vpool(p0)
vpool(p∗)ωH =
−ωLµL
µH
ωH =
−ωL
µH
(
µH−µL
p0(H)µH−p0(L)(µH−µL) + µL
)
Figure 4: Solutions to (Program 6-ω) when p0(H) ≥ p∗(H).
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose there exists a payoff v ∈ V(p0) that is implementable by an
SNP mechanism. Then v ≥ vRSW . Otherwise, the RSW mechanism presented in Table 1 along
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with a belief q satisfying
q(θ) =
p0(θ)∑
θ′∈S(vRSW ,v) p0(θ
′)
× 1S(vRSW ,v)(θ)
would satisfy conditions (a)-(b) of Definition 3.20 By Proposition 1, v ∈ V∗(p0).
From Corollary 1, there is a unique PBE payoff, v¯p0 , that Pareto dominates all other payoffs in
V∗(p0). If v 6= v¯p0 , then the belief q = p0 along with a deviation to v¯p0 would satisfy conditions
(a)-(b), contradicting the assumption that v is SNP implementable. Hence, v = v¯p0 .
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix some finite level of limited liability w ∈ (−∞, 0] and a prior
p0 ∈ int(∆(Θ)). Suppose there exists a first-best-surplus extracting equilibrium mechanism M .
Then, all types must recommend action el∗ . Furthermore, M , 〈w(θt)〉Tt=1 satisfies
(a) µ(θt, el∗) ·
(
ν −w(θt)
)
= S∗t = µ(θt, el∗) · ν − cl∗ , ∀t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
(b) µ(θt, el∗) ·
(
ν −w(θt)
) ≥ µ(θt, el∗) · (ν −w(θtˆ)), ∀tˆ 6= t, ∀t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
(c)
∑T
t=1 p0(θt)
(
µ(θt, el∗)− µ(θt, el)
) ·w(θt) ≥ cl∗ − cl, ∀l 6= l∗, and
(d) wn(θt) ≥ w, ∀t = 1, 2, . . . , T, ∀n = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
where (a) follows from each type extracting the first-best surplus, (b) follows from P-ICtˆt, (c)
follows from A-IClp0 , and (d) follows the limited liability constraints. We get i-iv of Lemma 3
by setting knt = w
n(θt)− cl∗ for n = 1, 2, . . . , N and t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
To see sufficiency, note that if Lemma 3 holds, then there is a mechanism M , 〈w(θt)〉Tt=1
that extracts the surplus and is p0-feasible. From Wagner et al. (2015), a p0-feasible surplus
extracting mechanism is strongly neologism proof, and therefore, an equilibrium mechanism.
20Given some set S ⊆ Y and some variable y ∈ Y , 1S(y) = 1 if y ∈ S and 0 otherwise
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